A constitutional theory of the family

Alessandro Cigno

Journal of Population Economics, 2006, vol. 19, issue 2, 259-283

Keywords: Families; Self-enforcing constitutions; Renegotiation-proofness; Altruism; Fertility; Saving; Transfers; Attention; Pensions; Credit rationing; C72; D02; D13; D71; D74; D91; H55; J13; J14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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Working Paper: A Constitutional Theory of the Family (2005)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00148-006-0062-2

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