A Constitutional Theory of the Family

Alessandro Cigno

No 1797, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: The paper re-examines the idea that a family can be viewed as a community governed by a self-enforcing constitution, and extends existing results in two directions. First, it identifies circumstances in which a constitution is renegotiation-proof. Second, it introduces parental altruism. The behavioural and policy implications are illustrated by showing the effects of public pensions and credit rationing. These implications are not much affected by whether altruism is assumed or not, but contrast sharply with the predictions of more conventional models.

Keywords: saving; fertility; altruism; renegotiation-proofness; self-enforcing constitutions; families; transfers; attention; pensions; credit rationing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 D13 D71 D74 D91 H55 J13 J14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2005-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - published in: Journal of Population Economics, 2006, 19 (2), 259-289

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Related works:
Journal Article: A constitutional theory of the family (2006)
Working Paper: A constitutional theory of the family (2005)
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