Asymptotic Analysis of Linear Feedback Nash Equilibria in Nonzero-Sum Linear-Quadratic Differential Games

Arie Weeren, Johannes Schumacher and Jacob Engwerda

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 1999, vol. 101, issue 3, No 9, 693-722

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we discuss nonzero-sum linear-quadratic differential games. For this kind of games, the Nash equilibria for different kinds of information structures were first studied by Starr and Ho. Most of the literature on the topic of nonzero-sum linear-quadratic differential games is concerned with games of fixed, finite duration; i.e., games are studied over a finite time horizon t f. In this paper, we study the behavior of feedback Nash equilibria for t f→∞. In the case of memoryless perfect-state information, we study the so-called feedback Nash equilibrium. Contrary to the open-loop case, we note that the coupled Riccati equations for the feedback Nash equilibrium are inherently nonlinear. Therefore, we limit the dynamic analysis to the scalar case. For the special case that all parameters are scalar, a detailed dynamical analysis is given for the quadratic system of coupled Riccati equations. We show that the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the Riccati equations depends strongly on the specified terminal values. Finally, we show that, although the feedback Nash equilibrium over any fixed finite horizon is generically unique, there can exist several different feedback Nash equilibria in stationary strategies for the infinite-horizon problem, even when we restrict our attention to Nash equilibria that are stable in the dynamical sense.

Keywords: Differential games; feedback Nash equilibria; differential equations; coupled Riccati equations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1021798322597

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