Nash Equilibria in a Differential Game of Economic Growth

C. González-Alcón, J. Sicilia and J. A. Álvarez
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C. González-Alcón: University of La Laguna
J. Sicilia: University of La Laguna
J. A. Álvarez: University of La Laguna

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 1999, vol. 103, issue 2, No 4, 337-357

Abstract: Abstract The present work studies a dynamic game of economic growth with two phases or periods. In the first phase, a political process exists where an institutional framework is fixed, that is, limits to the workers share in the national income, minimum limits of consumption by capitalists, and discretionality in investment are specified. This framework conditions the actions of the players (capitalists and workers). In the second phase, the Nash equilibria of the game are calculated. Lastly, the sensitivity of the results with respect to the institutional parameters is analyzed for a given scenario.

Keywords: Differential games; Nash equilibria; economic models; economic growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1021752719214

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