Identification of Efficient Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria in a Class of Differential Games1
Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero (),
Guiomar Martin-Herran and
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J. Martínez: Universidad de Valladolid
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2000, vol. 104, issue 1, No 14, 235-242
Abstract We present a method for the characterization of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria being Pareto efficient in a class of differential games. For that purpose, we propose a new approach based on new necessary and sufficient conditions for computing subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
Keywords: Differential games; subgame-perfect Nash equilibria; Pareto optimum; quasilinear partial differential equations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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