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Identification of Efficient Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria in a Class of Differential Games1

Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero (), Guiomar Martin-Herran and J. Martínez
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J. Martínez: Universidad de Valladolid

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2000, vol. 104, issue 1, No 14, 235-242

Abstract: Abstract We present a method for the characterization of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria being Pareto efficient in a class of differential games. For that purpose, we propose a new approach based on new necessary and sufficient conditions for computing subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Differential games; subgame-perfect Nash equilibria; Pareto optimum; quasilinear partial differential equations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1004693109541

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