Markov Perfect Equilibrium Existence for a Class of Undiscounted Infinite-Horizon Dynamic Games

A. Garcia and R. L. Smith
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A. Garcia: The Brattle Group
R. L. Smith: University of Michigan

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2000, vol. 106, issue 2, No 10, 429 pages

Abstract: Abstract We prove the existence of Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) for nonstationary undiscounted infinite-horizon dynamic games with alternating moves. A suitable finite-horizon equilibrium relaxation, the ending state constrained MPE, captures the relevant features of an infinite-horizon MPE for a long enough horizon, under a uniformly bounded reachability assumption.

Keywords: dynamic games; infinite horizon; average reward; alternating moves (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1004663800322

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