Infinite Hierarchical Potential Games

L. Mallozi, S. Tijs and M. Voorneveld
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L. Mallozi: Università di Napoli Federico II
S. Tijs: Tilburg University
M. Voorneveld: Tilburg University

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2000, vol. 107, issue 2, No 6, 287-296

Abstract: Abstract Hierarchical potential games with infinite strategy sets are considered. For these games, pessimistic Stackelberg equilibria are characterized as minimum points of the potential function; properties are studied and illustrated with examples.

Keywords: potential games; hierarchical decision making; multilevel optimization problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1026477202567

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