Noncooperative Games with Vector Payoffs Under Relative Pseudomonotonicity

E. Allevi, A. Gnudi, Igor Konnov () and S. Schaible
Additional contact information
E. Allevi: University of Bergamo
A. Gnudi: University of Bergamo
S. Schaible: University of California

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2003, vol. 118, issue 2, No 2, 245-254

Abstract: Abstract We consider the Nash equilibrium problem with vector payoffs in a topological vector space. By employing the recent concept of relative (pseudo) monotonicity, we establish several existence results for vector Nash equilibria and vector equilibria. The results strengthen in a major way existence results for vector equilibrium problems which were based on the usual (generalized) monotonicity concepts.

Keywords: Nash equilibria; vector equilibria; vector payoffs; relative (pseudo) monotonicity; existence results (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1025491103925

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