Agreeability and Time Consistency in Linear-State Differential Games

S. Jørgensen, Guiomar Martin-Herran and Georges Zaccour
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S. Jørgensen: University of Southern Denmark

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2003, vol. 119, issue 1, No 4, 49-63

Abstract: Abstract The paper identifies conditions under which time consistency and agreeability, two intertemporal individual rationality concepts, can be verified in linear-state differential games. An illustrative example drawn from environmental economics is provided.

Keywords: Differential games; individual rationality; environmental economics; agreeability; time consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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DOI: 10.1023/B:JOTA.0000005040.78280.a6

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