Agreeability and Time Consistency in Linear-State Differential Games
Guiomar Martin-Herran and
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S. Jørgensen: University of Southern Denmark
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2003, vol. 119, issue 1, No 4, 49-63
Abstract The paper identifies conditions under which time consistency and agreeability, two intertemporal individual rationality concepts, can be verified in linear-state differential games. An illustrative example drawn from environmental economics is provided.
Keywords: Differential games; individual rationality; environmental economics; agreeability; time consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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