Direct Method Comparing Efficient and Nonefficient Payoffs in Differential Games
Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero () and
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2003, vol. 119, issue 2, No 10, 395-405
Abstract In this note, we present a method that allows us to decide when a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimum, without the explicit knowledge of the respective solutions. For that purpose, we establish a sufficient condition in terms of an algebraic inequality where the gradient of the value functions of the cooperative and noncooperative games as well as the state and control variables are involved.
Keywords: Differential games; Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium; Pareto optimum; Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1023/B:JOTA.0000005453.96575.2a Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joptap:v:119:y:2003:i:2:d:10.1023_b:jota.0000005453.96575.2a
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/10957/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications is currently edited by Franco Giannessi and David G. Hull
More articles in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().