Enumeration of All the Extreme Equilibria in Game Theory: Bimatrix and Polymatrix Games

C. Audet, S. Belhaiza and P. Hansen
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C. Audet: GERAD and École Polytechnique de Montréal
S. Belhaiza: École Polytechnique de Montréal
P. Hansen: GERAD and HEC Montréal

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2006, vol. 129, issue 3, No 1, 349-372

Abstract: Abstract Bimatrix and polymatrix games are expressed as parametric linear 0–1 programs. This leads to an algorithm for the complete enumeration of their extreme equilibria, which is the first one proposed for polymatrix games. The algorithm computational experience is reported for two and three players on randomly generated games for sizes up to 14 × 14 and 13 × 13 × 13.

Keywords: Bimatrix games; polymatrix games; Nash equilibria; extreme equilibria; enumeration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10957-006-9070-3

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