Two Game Models for Cooperation with Implicit Noncooperation

M. Wei and J. B. Cruz ()
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M. Wei: Ohio State University
J. B. Cruz: Ohio State University

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2006, vol. 130, issue 3, No 8, 505-527

Abstract: Abstract We propose two flexible game models to represent and analyze cases that cannot be modeled by current game models. One is called sharing creditability game (SCG) and the other is called bottomline game (BLG). The new models transform cooperative games into new games that incorporate auxiliary information (noncooperative in nature) usually neglected in previous theories. The new games will be solved only by traditional noncooperative game theory. When the new solutions are applied to the original games, the solutions can reflect the auxiliary information in addition to the original objectives of the decision makers or players. Generally, the new solutions are different from the cooperative and the noncooperative solutions of the original games. Existing transferable utility (TU) games and noncooperative games will coincide with special cases of the two new game models. Using SCG and BLG, the prisoner’s dilemma can be reformulated and a richer set of decisions can be considered for the players. The two new game models have potential applications in military and socioeconomic situations.

Keywords: Cooperative game theory; noncooperative game theory; sharing creditability game; guaranteed payoff; bottomline game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/s10957-006-9116-6

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