Dynamically Consistent Cooperative Solution in a Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution

D. W. K. Yeung
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D. W. K. Yeung: Hong Kong Baptist University

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2007, vol. 134, issue 1, No 11, 143-160

Abstract: Abstract This paper presents a cooperative differential game of transboundary industrial pollution. A noted feature of the game model is that the industrial sectors remain competitive among themselves while the governments cooperate in pollution abatement. It is the first time that time consistent solutions are derived in a cooperative differential game on pollution control with industries and governments being separate entities. A stochastic version of the model is presented and a subgame-consistent cooperative solution is provided. This is the first study of pollution management in a stochastic differential game framework.

Keywords: Payoff; Optim Theory; Differential Game; Pollution Abatement; Optimality Principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10957-007-9240-y

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