Repeated Games with Bonuses

G. Schoenmakers (), J. Flesch, F. Thuijsman and O. J. Vrieze
Additional contact information
G. Schoenmakers: Maastricht University
J. Flesch: Maastricht University
F. Thuijsman: Maastricht University
O. J. Vrieze: Maastricht University

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2008, vol. 136, issue 3, No 10, 459-473

Abstract: Abstract This paper deals with 2-player zero-sum repeated games in which player 1 receives a bonus at stage t if he repeats the action he played at stage t−1. We investigate the optimality of simple strategies for player 1. A simple strategy for player 1 consists of playing the same mixed action at every stage, irrespective of past play. Furthermore, for games in which player 1 has a simple optimal strategy, we characterize the set of stationary optimal strategies for player 2.

Keywords: Noncooperative games; Repeated games; Stochastic games; Optimal strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10957-007-9318-6

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