Terror and Counterterror Operations: Differential Game with Cyclical Nash Solution

Gustav Feichtinger and A. J. Novak ()
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A. J. Novak: University of Vienna

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2008, vol. 139, issue 3, No 5, 556 pages

Abstract: Abstract The purpose of this paper is to study efficient measures to combat terror. To choose efficient actions against terror organizations, the response of terrorists has to be taken into consideration. Thus, an appropriate framework to study the intertemporal strategic interactions of Western governments and terror organizations is dynamic game theory. Using the open-loop Nash solution concept, it turns out that the system may exhibit long-run persistent oscillations. However, transitory behavior is nonunique.

Keywords: Differential games; Counterterror measures; Limit cycles; Indeterminacy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10957-008-9400-8

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