On Properness and Protectiveness in Two-Person Multicriteria Games

Marieke Quant, Peter Borm, G. Fiestras-Janeiro and F. Megen
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G. Fiestras-Janeiro: Universidade de Vigo
F. Megen: Tilburg University

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2009, vol. 140, issue 3, No 8, 499-512

Abstract: Abstract This paper extends the concepts of proper equilibria, protective behavior and prudent behavior to multicriteria games. Three types of proper equilibria based on different types of domination are introduced. It is shown that protective behavior coincides with prudent behavior. Possible relations and existence are analyzed.

Keywords: Multicriteria games; Proper behavior; Protective behavior; Prudent behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1007/s10957-008-9464-5

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