A Differential Game Related to Terrorism: Nash and Stackelberg Strategies

A. J. Novak (), Gustav Feichtinger and G. Leitmann
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A. J. Novak: University of Vienna
G. Leitmann: University of California

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2010, vol. 144, issue 3, No 7, 533-555

Abstract: Abstract The question of how best to prosecute the ‘war on terror’ leads to strategic interaction in an intertemporal setting. We consider a nonzero sum differential game between a government and a terrorist organisation. Due to the state-separability of the game we are able to determine Nash and Stackelberg solutions in analytic form. Their comparison as well as the sensitivity analysis deliver interesting insight into the design of efficient measures to combat terror.

Keywords: Differential games; Counterterror measures; Nash solution; Stackelberg solution; State-separable games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10957-009-9643-z

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