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Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Equilibria

Giuseppe De Marco and Jacqueline Morgan ()

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2010, vol. 145, issue 3, No 2, 429-449

Abstract: Abstract Multicriteria games describe strategic interactions in which players, having more than one criterion to take into account, don’t have an a-priori opinion on the relative importance of all these criteria. Roemer (Econ. Bull. 3:1–13, 2005) introduces an organizational interpretation of the concept of equilibrium: each player can be viewed as running a bargaining game among criteria. In this paper, we analyze the bargaining problem within each player by considering the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (see Kalai and Smorodinsky in Econometrica 43:513–518, 1975). We provide existence results for the so called Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria for a general class of disagreement points which properly includes the one considered by Roemer (Econ. Bull. 3:1–13, 2005). Moreover we look at the refinement power of this equilibrium concept and show that it is an effective selection device even when combined with classical refinement concepts based on stability with respect to perturbations; in particular, we consider the extension to multicriteria games of the Selten’s trembling hand perfect equilibrium concept (see Selten in Int. J. Game Theory 4:25–55, 1975) and prove that perfect Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria exist and properly refine both the perfect equilibria and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria.

Keywords: Multicriteria games; Equilibrium refinements; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; Perfectness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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