Asymmetric Supply Function Equilibria with Forward Contracts

Edward J. Anderson () and Xinmin Hu ()
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Edward J. Anderson: University of Sydney Business School
Xinmin Hu: RepuTex (AU) Pty Ltd

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2012, vol. 152, issue 1, No 11, 198-224

Abstract: Abstract We consider markets in which firms offer supply functions, rather than a quantity or price alone: the most important examples are wholesale electricity markets. The equilibria in such markets can be hard to characterize. In many cases, whole families of supply function equilibria occur so there are difficulties in determining which equilibrium will be chosen. In this paper, we consider supply function equilibria, when firms hold forward contracts, which is common in electricity markets. Under the assumption that contract positions have been fixed in advance, we characterize the families of supply function equilibria in a duopoly. The existence of forward contracts implies a tightening of the conditions for an equilibrium, and a greater likelihood that no equilibrium solution exists. In the case of three firms, there can be at most one supply function equilibrium, provided that the lowest demand be small enough.

Keywords: Supply functions; Equilibrium; Electricity markets; Forward contracts; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10957-011-9879-2

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