An Ordinal Game Theory Approach to the Analysis and Selection of Partners in Public–Private Partnership Projects

Jamal Ouenniche (), Aristotelis Boukouras and Mohammad Rajabi
Additional contact information
Jamal Ouenniche: University of Edinburgh
Aristotelis Boukouras: University of Leicester
Mohammad Rajabi: University of Edinburgh

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2016, vol. 169, issue 1, No 16, 314-343

Abstract: Abstract Nowadays, public–private partnership projects have become a standard for delivering public services in both developed and developing countries. In this paper, we are concerned with the analysis of private sector proposals and the selection of the private sector partner to whom to award the contract. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been addressed within a game theory framework. To fill this gap, we model this decision problem as a static non-cooperative game of complete information and propose a new ordinal game theory algorithm for finding an optimal generalized Nash equilibrium. The proposed algorithm determines a single ranking of proposals or bidders that takes account of multiple performance criteria and reflects both the public sector and the private sector perspectives, and can handle any number of private sector players and any number of contractual terms. An illustrative scenario is provided to guide the reader through the workings of the proposed ordinal game theory algorithm. The proposed ordinal game theory-based analysis framework can be used by the private sector to analyse any set of potential proposals most likely to be submitted by bidders and to assist with the choice of bidding strategies, and by the public sector player to analyse any set of potential proposals most likely to be submitted under any set of contractual terms and to assist with the choice of a realistic set of contractual terms and their performance measures.

Keywords: Ordinal game theory; Non-cooperative games; Public–private partnership; Generalized Nash equilibria; 91A10; 91A80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10957-015-0844-3 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joptap:v:169:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s10957-015-0844-3

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/10957/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10957-015-0844-3

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications is currently edited by Franco Giannessi and David G. Hull

More articles in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().