Aggregate Wind Power Production via Coalitional Games and Optimal Control

Jeffrey Eiyike () and Dario Bauso ()
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Jeffrey Eiyike: University of Agriculture
Dario Bauso: University of Sheffield

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2018, vol. 178, issue 1, No 14, 289-303

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, benefits from aggregating independent wind power producers are analyzed in a scenario, in which the producers willingly form coalitions to increase their expected profits. For every deviation from the declared contract, the coalition is penalized and a cost is paid, if the producers want to update their contract. The underlying idea is that coalitions reduce the risk of being penalized. The main contribution of this paper is a new market model and an allocation mechanism based on optimal control and coalitional games with transferable utilities. Optimal control is used to obtain the optimal contract size, while coalitional games provide an insight on stable revenue allocations, namely allocations, that make the grand coalition preferable to all producers.

Keywords: Coalitional games; Optimal control; Wind power; Reward allocation; Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman; 91A12; 93E20; 91A80; 49L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s10957-018-1282-9

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