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A Method for Multi-Leader–Multi-Follower Games by Smoothing the Followers’ Response Function

Atsushi Hori (), Daisuke Tsuyuguchi and Ellen H. Fukuda
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Atsushi Hori: Seikei University
Daisuke Tsuyuguchi: Wakayama Prefectural Board of Education
Ellen H. Fukuda: Kyoto University

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2024, vol. 203, issue 1, No 13, 305-335

Abstract: Abstract The multi-leader–multi-follower game (MLMFG) involves two or more leaders and followers and serves as a generalization of the Stackelberg game and the single-leader–multi-follower game. Although MLMFG covers wide range of real-world applications, its research is still sparse. Notably, fundamental solution methods for this class of problems remain insufficiently established. A prevailing approach is to recast the MLMFG as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) and solve it using a solver. Meanwhile, interpreting the solution to the EPEC in the context of MLMFG may be complex due to shared decision variables among all leaders, followers’ strategies that each leader can unilaterally change, but the variables are essentially controlled by followers. To address this issue, we introduce a response function of followers’ noncooperative game that is a function with leaders’ strategies as a variable. Employing this approach allows the MLMFG to be solved as a single-level differentiable variational inequality using a smoothing scheme for the followers’ response function. We also demonstrate that the sequence of solutions to the smoothed variational inequality converges to a stationary equilibrium of the MLMFG. Finally, we illustrate the behavior of the smoothing method by numerical experiments.

Keywords: Multi-leader–follower game; Equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints; Smoothing approximation; Nash equilibrium problem; Bilevel optimization; 91A65; 91A10; 90C33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10957-024-02506-2

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