Reformulations for Projected Solutions of Generalized Games
Carlos Calderón (),
Marco Castellani (),
John Cotrina () and
Massimiliano Giuli ()
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Carlos Calderón: Instituto de Matemática y Ciencias Afines
Marco Castellani: University of L’Aquila
John Cotrina: Universidad del Pacífico
Massimiliano Giuli: University of L’Aquila
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2025, vol. 204, issue 1, No 4, 13 pages
Abstract:
Abstract We show that projected solutions of a generalized game correspond to classical ones of an auxiliary generalized game obtained by doubling the number of players. Based on this reformulation and using known results for the existence of classical solutions, we deduce some new existence results for projected solutions of generalized Nash equilibrium problems and quasivariational inequalities.
Keywords: Projected solution; Nash equilibrium; Variational inequality; Abstract economy; 49J40; 49J53; 91A10; 91B50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10957-024-02591-3
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