Solidarity Value for Graph Games
Daniel Li () and
Erfang Shan ()
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Daniel Li: Shanghai University
Erfang Shan: Shanghai University
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2025, vol. 206, issue 2, No 12, 13 pages
Abstract:
Abstract For cooperative games, the Shapley value is the most eminent allocation rule that represents the economic rationality, and the solidarity value takes into account social and psychological aspects. The (communication) graph game was developed by Myerson (1977), and the well-known Myerson value is the Shapley value for graph games. In this paper we propose the graph solidarity value for graph games, in which a player’s payoff is derived from the solidarity worths of connected coalitions and the surplus of components. We also recall the graph egalitarian value introduced by Béal et al. (2012) by giving different characteristic properties, from which we see that the graph solidarity value lies between the Myerson value and the graph egalitarian value.
Keywords: Cooperative game; Solidarity value; Graph solidarity value; 91A12; 91A43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10957-025-02709-1
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