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Equilibria in Strategy-Form Games with Both Noncooperative and Cooperative Frameworks

Zhe Yang ()
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Zhe Yang: Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2025, vol. 207, issue 1, No 16, 25 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we consider a class of strategy-form games, where the agents play a noncooperative game and a cooperative game concurrently. In this model, we introduce the notion of equilibria, and prove the equilibrium existence theorem with finitely many agents and finite dimensional strategy spaces by the result of Bonnisseau and Iehl $$\acute{\hbox {e}}$$ e ´ (2007). Furthermore, we provide a generalization to strategy-form games with infinite dimensional strategy spaces. Finally, we define the weak equilibrium concept for strategy-form games with infinitely many agents, noncooperative and cooperative frameworks, and prove the weak equilibrium existence theorem.

Keywords: Equilibrium; Strategy-form game; Noncooperative and cooperative frameworks; Existence; 91A07; 91A10; 91A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10957-025-02774-6

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