Accumulation Games, Part 1: Noisy Search

K. Kikuta and W. H. Ruckle
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K. Kikuta: Toyama University
W. H. Ruckle: Clemson University

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 1997, vol. 94, issue 2, No 6, 395-408

Abstract: Abstract In an accumulation game, a hider places objects at locations, and a seeker examines these locations. If the seeker discovers an object, the seeker confiscates it. The goal of the hider is to accumulate a certain number of objects before a given time, and the goal of the seeker is to prevent this. In this paper, we first classify various possible variations on the accumulation game. Next, we discuss the so-called noisy accumulation game in which the hider can observe each action of the seeker. We present the solution of this game for all but some marginal cases and illustrate it with computational examples.

Keywords: Zero-sum games; search games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1022639813629

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