A Differential R&D Game: Implications for Knowledge-Based Growth Models

D. Vencatachellum
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D. Vencatachellum: Institut d'économie appliquée, École des Hautes Études Commerciales

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 1998, vol. 96, issue 1, No 9, 175-189

Abstract: Abstract This paper compares the outcomes of strategic and nonstrategic research and development (R&D). Firms undertake cost-reducing R&D in an environment where benefits accrue from their rivals' R&D via a common pool of knowledge. We demonstrate that multiple suboptimal equilibria exist; under these conditions, growth models which do not consider strategic interactions will overestimate or underestimate the growth rate.

Keywords: Differential games; growth theory; research and development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1022623419371

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