New Method to Characterize Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in Differential Games

Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero, J. Martínez and Guiomar Martin-Herran
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J. Martínez: Universidad de Valladolid

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 1998, vol. 96, issue 2, No 7, 377-395

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we present a method for computing Nash equilibria in feedback strategies. This method gives necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize subgame perfect equilibria by means of a system of quasilinear partial differential equations. This characterization allows one to know explicitly the solution of the game in some cases. In other cases, this approach makes a qualitative study easier. We apply this method to nonrenewable resource games.

Keywords: Differential games; subgame perfect Nash equilibria; quasilinear partial differential equations; characteristic systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1022674215872

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