New Method to Characterize Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in Differential Games
Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero (),
J. Martínez and
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J. Martínez: Universidad de Valladolid
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 1998, vol. 96, issue 2, No 7, 377-395
Abstract In this paper, we present a method for computing Nash equilibria in feedback strategies. This method gives necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize subgame perfect equilibria by means of a system of quasilinear partial differential equations. This characterization allows one to know explicitly the solution of the game in some cases. In other cases, this approach makes a qualitative study easier. We apply this method to nonrenewable resource games.
Keywords: Differential games; subgame perfect Nash equilibria; quasilinear partial differential equations; characteristic systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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