Regulator Vulnerabilities to Political Pressures and Political Tie Intensity: The Moderating Effects of Regulatory and Political Distance

George O. White (), Jean J. Boddewyn, Tazeeb Rajwani and Thomas A. Hemphill
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George O. White: University of Michigan-Flint
Jean J. Boddewyn: The City University of New York
Thomas A. Hemphill: University of Michigan-Flint

Management International Review, 2018, vol. 58, issue 5, No 4, 743-769

Abstract: Abstract This study applies the institution-based view and neo-institutional theory in addressing how managerial perceptions of regulator vulnerabilities to political pressure, and institutional distance, influence intensification of political ties. Our analysis of 181 wholly owned foreign subsidiary (WOFSs) operating in the Philippines suggests that managerial perceptions of regulator vulnerability to political pressures positively enhance the intensification of political ties. Our results also reveal that regulatory distance and, more importantly, the simultaneous presence of political and regulatory distance diminish the positive relationship between managerial perceptions of regulator vulnerability to political pressures and a WOFS’s propensity to enhance the intensification of political ties. Managerial implications and future research directions are discussed.

Keywords: Political tie intensity; Political pressure; Government interference; Regulatory distance; Political distance; Institution-based view; Neo-institutional theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11575-018-0351-5

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