Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?

Jason Shachat and J. Swarthout

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2004, vol. 59, issue 3, 359-373

Abstract: We conducted an experiment in which each subject repeatedly played a game with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies against some computer-implemented mixed strategy. The results indicate subjects are successful at detecting and exploiting deviations from Nash equilibrium. However, there is heterogeneity in subject behavior and performance. We present a one variable model of dynamic random belief formation which rationalizes observed heterogeneity and other features of the data. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s001860400354

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