Do We Detect and Exploit Mixed Strategy Play by Opponents?

Jason Shachat and J. Swarthout

Experimental from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We conducted an experiment in which each subject repeatedly played a game with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies against some computer-implemented mixed strategy. The results indicate subjects are successful at detecting and exploiting deviations from Nash equilibrium. However, there is heterogeneity in subject behavior and performance. We present a one variable model of dynamic random belief formation which rationalizes observed heterogeneity and other features of the data.

Keywords: best response correspondence; mixed strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2003-10-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC - PC-MSWORD; pages: 21 . We never published this piece and now we would like to reduce our mailing and xerox cost by posting it.
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Journal Article: Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents? (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0310001

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