Crime and social norms

Nuno Garoupa

Portuguese Economic Journal, 2003, vol. 2, issue 3, No 1, 144 pages

Abstract: Abstract. In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of crime. It is shown that law and norms are substitutes in achieving a stable equilibrium. Here we offer a new interpretation of different theories of social norms in the context of crime and deterrence. The law and economics theory is presented as an ‘opportunism-limiting’ approach to norms whereas the evolutionary theory is presented as an ‘opportunity cost’ approach.

Keywords: Crime; Punishment; Norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10258-003-0022-7 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:portec:v:2:y:2003:i:3:d:10.1007_s10258-003-0022-7

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/10258/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10258-003-0022-7

Access Statistics for this article

Portuguese Economic Journal is currently edited by Luís F. Costa

More articles in Portuguese Economic Journal from Springer, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().