Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenael Piaser () and Uday Rajan ()

Review of Economic Design, 2012, vol. 16, issue 4, 283-296

Abstract: We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard: principals compete through mechanisms in the presence of agents who take unobservable actions. In this context, we provide a rationale for restricting principals to make use of simple mechanisms, which correspond to direct mechanisms in the standard framework of Myerson (J Math Econ 10:67–81, 1982 ). Our results complement those of Han (J Econ Theory 137(1):610–626, 2007 ) who analyzes a complete information setting where agents’ actions are fully contractible. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

Keywords: Moral hazard; Multiple-principal multiple-agent; Simple mechanisms; D82; D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Working Paper: Competing Mechanism Games of Moral Hazard: Communication and Robustness (2011)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-012-0116-8

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