Competing Mechanism Games of Moral Hazard: Communication and Robustness

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenael Piaser () and Uday Rajan ()
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Uday Rajan: Ross School of Business, University of Michigan;

No 196, CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS

Abstract: We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard: principals compete through mechanisms in the presence of agents who take unobservable actions. In this context, we provide a rationale for restricting principals to make use of simple mechanisms, which correspond to direct mechanisms in the standard framework of Myerson (1982). Our results complement those of Han (2007) who analyzes a complete information setting where agents’ actions are fully contractible.

Keywords: Moral hazard; multiple-principal multiple-agent; simple mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2011-06-10, Revised 2011-06-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-cta
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness (2012)
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