Arbitrage, strategic inefficiency and self-regulation

Dimitrios Voliotis ()

Review of Economic Design, 2013, vol. 17, issue 1, 27-41

Abstract: This paper develops a multi-period strategic market game in two different settings, one of a finite-period finance economy, and its extension to infinite periods but with overlapping term of traders. Under these two different contexts, we address the possibility of strategies that Pareto improve the outcome of the game. In this effort, both the introduction of a regulation scheme and the innovative role of provision of traders with incentives to self-police these designated strategies play an important role. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Keywords: Strategic market games; Self-regulation; OLG Folk Theorem; C73; D53; E4; E5; G18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-012-0133-7

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