The organization of expertise in the presence of communication

Flavia Roldán

Review of Economic Design, 2013, vol. 17, issue 1, 63-81

Abstract: Principal decision-makers are sometimes obliged to rely on multiple sources of information when drawing conclusions about the desirability of given actions in response to decisions they face. They may hire specialized agents to inform their decisions. Principals have authority both to allow communication among agents of information and to prevent information-sharing. I assume that communication facilitates the emergence of some complementarities among agents, but it may also promote collusion. I study the optimal design of contracts focusing on how to sequence communication of expertise. I show that from a principal’s point of view, when the advantages of allowing communication dominate, communication is more effective before effort choices are made rather than after. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Keywords: Information acquisition; Communication; Collusion; Expertise; Organization; D81; D82; L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Related works:
Working Paper: The organization of expertise in the presence of communication (2012)
Working Paper: The organization of expertise in the presence of communication (2009)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-012-0139-1

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