The organization of expertise in the presence of communication
No D/835, IESE Research Papers from IESE Business School
A decision-maker has to elicit information from informed multiple experts about a policy's value. The principal may prevent communication among the agents. However, it may be in the principal's interest to allow communication among them. I assume that communication allows synergies to emerge among the experts but also opens the possibility of collusion among them. I study the optimal design of contracts, focusing on the organization of expertise in the communication phase. I show that, from the principal's point of view, when the advantage of synergies prevails over the collusion problem, communication dominates the no communication case. However, synergies will always prevail if the principal lets agents communicate with each other before they make their choices rather than after.
Keywords: information acquisition; communication; coordination; collusion; expertise; organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-cta
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Journal Article: The organization of expertise in the presence of communication (2013)
Working Paper: The organization of expertise in the presence of communication (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0835
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