Accuracy in contests: players’ perspective

Mustafa Yildirim

Review of Economic Design, 2015, vol. 19, issue 1, 67-90

Abstract: We propose a political theory for the slow adoption of technology in sports and other contests. We investigate players’ preferences for new technology that improves contest accuracy. Modeling accuracy as the elasticity of “production” in a standard Tullock contest, we show that players may dislike accuracy if heterogeneity among them is: (1) sufficiently low; (2) moderate when the initial accuracy is low; or (3) high when the initial accuracy is high. We apply our results to the recent adoption of goal-line technology by major European soccer leagues. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Contests; Accuracy; Favorite; Underdog; Goal-line technology; C72; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10058-015-0166-9 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Accuracy in Contests: Players' Perspective (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:reecde:v:19:y:2015:i:1:p:67-90

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10058

DOI: 10.1007/s10058-015-0166-9

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Economic Design is currently edited by Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

More articles in Review of Economic Design from Springer, Society for Economic Design
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().