Accuracy in Contests: Players' Perspective

Mustafa Yildirim

No 746, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: We propose a political theory for the slow adoption of technology in sports and other contests. We investigate players’preferences for new technology that improves contest accuracy. Modeling accuracy as the elasticity of "production" in a standard Tullock contest, we show that players may be against higher accuracy if heterogeneity among them is:(1) sufficiently low; (2) moderate but the initial accuracy is low; or (3) high but the initial accuracy is high. We apply our results to the recent adoption of goal-line technology by major European soccer leagues.

Keywords: contest accuracy; politics; slow technology adoption; goal-line technology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2013-09-23, Revised 2013-09-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Accuracy in contests: players’ perspective (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:hastef:0746

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