Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance

Makoto Shimoji

Review of Economic Design, 2017, vol. 21, issue 4, No 1, 252 pages

Abstract: Abstract We employ weak dominance to analyze both first-price and second-price auctions under the discrete private-value setting. We provide a condition under which the expected revenue from second-price auction is higher than that of first-price auction. We also provide implications for large auctions, including the “virtual” revenue equivalence.

Keywords: Discrete private-value auctions; Revenue comparison; Weak dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Revenue Comparison of Discrete Private-Value Auctions via Weak Dominance (2014)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-017-0202-z

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