Revenue Comparison of Discrete Private-Value Auctions via Weak Dominance

Makoto Shimoji

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: We employ weak dominance to analyze both first-price and second-price auctions under the discrete private-value setting. We provide a condition under which the expected revenue from second-price auction is higher than that of first-price auction. We also provide implications for large auctions, including the "virtual" revenue equivalence.

Keywords: Discrete Private-Value Auctions; Revenue Comparison; Weak Dominance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yor:yorken:14/13

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