Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games

Toru Hokari (), Yukihiko Funaki () and Peter Sudhölter
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Toru Hokari: Keio University

Review of Economic Design, 2020, vol. 24, issue 3, No 4, 187-197

Abstract: Abstract We show that neither Peleg’s nor Tadenuma’s well-known axiomatizations of the core by non-emptiness, individual rationality, super-additivity, and max consistency or complement consistency, respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if anonymity is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative interior are the only two solutions that satisfy Peleg’s axioms together with anonymity and converse max consistency on the domain of convex games.

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games (2019)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00231-6

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