Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games

Toru Hokari (), Yukihiko Funaki () and Peter Sudhölter
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Toru Hokari: Faculty of Economics, Postal: Keio University

No 13/2019, Discussion Papers on Economics from University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics

Abstract: We show that neither Peleg's nor Tadenuma's well-known axiomatizations of the core by non-emptiness, individual rationality, super-additivity, and max consistency or complement consistency, respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if anonymity is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative interior are only two solutions that satisfy Peleg's axioms together with anonymity and converse max consistency on the domain of convex games.

Keywords: Convex TU game; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2019-12-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ore
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Related works:
Journal Article: Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2019_013

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