A fair procedure in a marriage market

Aditya Kuvalekar () and Antonio Romero-Medina ()
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Aditya Kuvalekar: University of Essex
Antonio Romero-Medina: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

Review of Economic Design, 2024, vol. 28, issue 3, No 2, 533-550

Abstract: Abstract We propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields a stable matching. Moreover, the outcome is a Rawlsian stable matching if the number of men and women is equal. Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets where fairness considerations are important.

Keywords: Two-sided matching; Fair procedure; Deferred acceptance algorithm; C72; C78; D41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00348-4

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