A fair procedure in a marriage market
Antonio Romero-Medina and
Aditya Vijay Kuvalekar
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina ()
UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
We propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields astable matching. Moreover, the outcome is often a non-extremal matching, and in fact, is a Rawlsian stable matching if the matching market is "balanced." Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and, hence, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets in which fairness considerations are important.
Keywords: Deferred; Acceptance; Algorithm; Fair; Procedure; Two-Sided; Matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D41 C78 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:31711
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