Multiproject team assignments

Katerina Sherstyuk

Review of Economic Design, 1999, vol. 4, issue 3, 254 pages

Abstract: We consider expected profit maximizing mechanisms for a principal who has to allocate a group of agents among a number of projects, assuming that the principal has incomplete information about each agent's ability type, and the agents follow the Bayes-Nash or the dominant strategy equilibrium behavior. We find that while expected profit maximizing mechanisms are similar to the optimal auction (Myerson, 1981), the incentive compatibility constraints are much more restrictive. Interestingly, these constraints are satisfied if each agent's characteristics change in a consistent manner not only with types, but also from project to project.

Keywords: Allocation problem; teams; incentive mechanisms; monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-09-24
Note: Received: 30 April 1997 / Accepted: 22 December 1998
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Working Paper: Multiproject Team Assignments (1997)
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