Multiproject Team Assignments

Katerina Sherstyuk

No 559, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: We consider expected profit maximizing mechanisms for a principal who has to allocate a group of agents among a number of projets, assuming that the principal has incomplete information about each agent's ability type, and the agents follow the Bayes-Nash or the dominant strategy equilibrium behavior. We find that while expected profit maximizing mechanisms ar similare to the optimal auction, the incentive compatibility constraints are much more restrictive. Interestingly, these constraints are satisfied if each agent's characteristics change in a consistent manner not only with types, but also from project to project.

Keywords: STATISTICS; GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM; PROJECT MANAGEMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 1997
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