The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense

Marc Fleurbaey

Review of Economic Design, 2005, vol. 9, issue 2, 145-166

Abstract: It is shown that the Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering appears as a very natural solution to the problem of defining social preferences over distributions of divisible goods. The paper analyses various ways of deriving this social ordering from minimally egalitarian conditions and informational parsimony requirements. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Keywords: Social welfare; social choice; fairness; egalitarian-equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Working Paper: The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: a defence (2017)
Working Paper: The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense (2005)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-005-0124-z

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