The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense

Marc Fleurbaey

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Abstract: It is shown that the Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering appears as a very natural solution to the problem of defining social preferences over distributions of divisible goods. The paper analyses various ways of deriving this social ordering from minimally egalitarian conditions and informational parsimony requirements.

Keywords: social welfare; social choice; fairness; egalitarian-equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published in Review of Economic Design, 2005, 9, pp.145-166

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: a defence (2017)
Journal Article: The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00247024

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