Nash implementation with an infinite-dimensional trade space

Guillaume Bernis () and Gaël Giraud

Review of Economic Design, 2005, vol. 9, issue 3, 287 pages

Abstract: This paper deals with the problem of implementing the Walras correspondence via Nash equilibria, in exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and finitely many households with possibly non-ordered preferences. We explicitly construct a feasible mechanism enjoying some features, which have natural economic meanings. Under a fairly weak boundary condition, this game fully implements the Walras equilibria. If this condition is not fulfilled, our mechanism nevertheless implements the constrained Walras equilibria. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Keywords: Mechanism design; constrained Walras equilibria; Banach lattice; non-ordered preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-005-0130-1

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